Abstract
Introduction
The preparations for the enlargement of the European Union (EU) to include the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) have begun and it seems realistic that several Central and Eastern European Countries will have joined the EU by the year 2005.
This impending enlargement has initiated a number of studies attempting to assess the possible impact of an enlarged EU. As the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) remains a cornerstone of EU co-operation and the CEEC have a comparative advantage in agriculture, a number of these studies, as well as the present study, focus on agriculture. This is because an eastward enlargement with the 10 CEEC will expand the Union's agricultural area by 52 per cent, increase production and competition on the European market as well as on the world market. This could also affect future negotiations on agriculture within the World Trade Organisation. More urgently, an enlargement within the current set of agricultural policies could have major impacts on the EU budget.
Previous studies dealing with the EU/CEEC integration include Brenton and Gros (1993) ; Tyers (1993 Tyers ( ,1994 ; Tangermann and Josling (1994) ; Anderson and Tyers (1995) , Slater and Atkinson (1995), European Commission (1995) and Tangermann (1996) . However, these are all partial equilibrium studies that disregard potentially important linkages between agriculture, services and manufactures. Furthermore, only the European Commission (1995) takes into account the impact of the Uruguay Round. Multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) studies include Hertel et al. (1997b) . However, Hertel et al. do not explicitly capture important elements of the 1992 CAP reform, such as the set-aside premiums and the milk quotas, or tackle the important question of whether the value-based or the quantitative restrictions of the Uruguay Round Agreement will become binding. Furthermore, the study is undertaken with a rather limited commodity structure, which is ill suited to the detailed commodity specification of the agricultural commitments of the Uruguay Round Agreement and the Agenda 2000 reform proposal. Baldwin et al. (1997) also use a multi-regional general equilibrium model but with a very stylised implementation of the CAP and no endogenous budget allocation.
Moreover, the previous studies have failed to assess the integration process in a projection mode and to take the EU Commissions Agenda 2000 proposal into account. These aspects are important in order to capture the interaction between structural changes and policy reforms in the period before integrating the Central and Eastern European Countries into the EU. This paper deals explicitly with several of these aspects by giving special attention to an extended The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 a description of the applied methodology is given focusing on, the theoretical model, the database, and the representation of the CAP instruments.
Section 3 describes the construction of the baseline (the projections) and in Section 4 introduces the experimental design. Section 5 contains the results of the simulations and Sections 6 and 7 discuss the validity of the results and the conclusions, respectively.
Methodology
The fundamental CGE framework used for this study is based on the GTAP applied general equilibrium model of the world economy (Hertel, 1997a) , and the GTAP database (version 4, with 1995 as the base year) (McDougall, 1998) , which is solved using GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson, 1996) .
We have chosen to use a relatively standard multi-region, static model that assumes perfectly competitive markets, constant returns to scale technology, a non-homothetic private demand system and a foreign trade structure charactorised by the Armington assumption. This approach allows us to focus on the institutional features of the Common Agricultural Policy and the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA) and we therefore abstract from features like imperfect competition and increasing return to scale. An example of a model with such characteristics can be seen in Hertel et al. (1997b) . We briefly return to this in section 7 below.
The macroeconomic closure (the solution to the problem of the fundamental indeterminacy of investments in comparative static models) applied is a neo-classical closure where investments are endogenous and adjusts to accommodate any changes in savings. This approach is adopted at the global level and investments are then allocated across regions to equalise the marginal rate of return in all regions. Although global investments and savings must be equal, this does not apply at the regional level, where the trade balance is endogenously determined as the difference between regional savings and regional investments. This is valid as regional savings enter the regional utility function.
As the numéraire we use a price index as suggested by de Melo and Robinson (1989) and de Melo and Tarr (1992) , specifically the global primary factor price index.
As mentioned earlier, we use the GTAP database, which covers 50 commodities and 45 regions.
But to keep the model within computational limits and focus on the issues of interest the data are aggregated to 16 regions and 19 commodities of which ten are primary agricultural goods. Regions and commodities are given in Table 1 . Finally, in order to be able to capture the effects of important institutional features of the CAP and the Uruguay Round Agreement, the standard global general equilibrium model (GTAP) has been modified in a number of ways with special attention given to the modelling of: 1) Import and export policies: import tariff reductions and value and quantity based restrictions on export subsidies; 2) Compensatory payments to arable land and livestock, together with set-aside requirements and base area restrictions;
3) Milk and sugar quotas;
4) The European Union budget and the important effects of future inter-regional transfers between the EU and the CEEC.
Import and export policies
Import tariffs and export subsidy rates are adjusted in line with the Uruguay Round Agreement offers, and fixed at the agreed rates according to the Uruguay Round Agreement if these rates are binding. We also abolish the mechanism of variable import levies and variable export subsidy rates in the EU as these clearly are against the spirit of the GATT Agreement, cf. (GATT, 1994a) .
The initial 1995 (average effective) tariff data in the database is therefore compared with the actual WTO tariff schedules and in those cases where the 1995 protection rates exceed the tariff schedules we reduce the rates to the bound rates agreed upon in the Agreement. With respect to the minimum access requirements it is important to note that neither the current nor the minimum access tariff rate quota constitute a minimum purchase agreement. They provide only the 'opportunity' to import under the advantages of a preferential or suspended tariff. This 'opportunity' is provided given the reduced average effective tariff rates implemented in our study.
In contrast to earlier studies on the Uruguay Round Agreement, we follow the precise commitments and target the value of export subsidies and not just the export subsidy rate. Moreover, we assess whether it will be the quantitative or the value based export requirements for agricultural subsidies that will be binding in the Uruguay Round Agreement. The system of intervention and guaranteed prices is not explicitly modelled in this study but implicitly represented through the setting of border protection rates. We have chosen this strategy deliberately, as the main (sustainable) mechanism in the long run is border protection and not storage (which the EU Commission also recognises in for example the Agenda 2000 proposal). This approach also gives us an opportunity to illustrate to what extent and in which markets an increased competition from Central and Eastern European farmers potentially could affect future production in EU-15 if storage (intervention) and border protection are unchanged. Or to put it differently -in which markets the EU following an enlargement would have to change intervention prices so as to avoid possibly large increases in the level of intervention stocks in the European Union.
Compensatory payments to land
The compensatory payments, the set-aside requirements and the definition and size of the base areas are all important elements of the EU grain policy. To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to assess the eastern enlargement while incorporating these effects in a general equilibrium, multi-regional model.
The compensatory payments to land are implemented as input subsidies to agricultural land 1 . The resulting hectare premiums are introduced in the model by the following definition:
As described in McDougall (1998) all direct subsidies to agriculture in the OECD countries are based upon the OECD PSE tables for 1995. In the GTAP database these subsidies are represented as output subsidies. However, the compensatory payments to land in the EU which constitute a significant share of the overall direct subsidies, are not linked directly to production. Therefore, in the initial GTAP database input subsidies to land are added (hectare premiums) and output subsidies are adjusted to provide a more accurate measure of direct support.
where pl j r , is the market price of agricultural land used by sector j in region r, pl j r f , is the land price paid by farms and hp j r , is the sector specific hectare premium per hectare. The total budgetary expenditure on hectare premiums by sector is given by:
where q j r f , is the input of agricultural land including set-aside, into sector j in region r, multiplied by the sector specific hectare premium hp j r , .
In our initial database we calibrate hp j r , such as to comply with the compensatory rates paid to reform crops and set-aside in the European Union in 1995. At the same time, we also calibrate q j r f ,
to the historic levels of land used in sector j in 1995 inclusive the required set-aside rate of land 2 .
Finally, the total area for which compensatory payments can be requested in the European Union is restricted to the total base area of 53,563,000 hectares of land. In order to be able to check this restriction we introduce the following equation into the model:
where r Q is the total area receiving compensatory payments. If r Q exceeds the total base area of the European Union hectare premiums are reduced proportionally in line with the overshoot of the total base area.
The implementation of compensatory payments to land is modelled by fixing the hectare premium per hectare and allowing land to adjust endogenously between the reform crops given that the European Union's base area is not exceeded.
In the special case of oilseeds, however, the Blair House agreement puts a specific restriction on the grown area of oilseeds, namely 5,482,000 hectares including set-aside within the total area r Q of the European Union. In 1995 this base area for oilseeds was exceeded, forcing the European Union 2 In 1995 the average set-aside rate in the European Union was 14.4 percent, which on average meant that for every hectare of land where compensatory payments were paid only 0.856 hectare was productive. To change the set-aside rate from 14.4 percent in the 1995 base year we simply increase/decrease the productivity of land used in sector j and recalibrate r j hp , , using the new share of land allocated to production and set-aside per hectare.
to reduce compensatory payments per hectare given to oilseeds proportionally with the amount of excess land used.
This implies that with the Blair House agreement in force, we have modelled compensatory payments to oilseeds by fixing the total budget expenditure on compensatory payments given to oilseeds while allowing the corresponding hectare premiums to adjust endogenously.
Compensatory payments to livestock
Similarly, we model compensatory payments to livestock as input subsidies in the case of suckler cow and breeding ewe premiums 3 . In the case of male animal and steer premiums we have chosen to model these premiums as output subsidies to livestock production. This difference in implementing compensatory payments to livestock reflects the fact that suckler cows and breeding ewes are a part of the production capital used to produce slaughter animals, while male animals and steers are final products sold directly to the slaughter houses.
The implementation of compensatory payments to suckler cows, breeding ewes, male animals and steers are modelled in the same manner as oilseed premiums, namely by fixing the total EU budgetary expenditure on premiums paid and allowing premiums per cow/ewe and male animal/steer to adjust endogenously. This is done because the ceiling on premium rights for breeding ewes, male animals and steers were fully utilised in the European Union in 1995, while for suckling cows the utilisation of rights was just below the total amount of premium rights, cf.
(European Commission 1997b).
Milk and Sugar Quotas
Raw milk and sugar beet quotas in the European Union are introduced into the model by the following price link: iii) Agricultural export subsidies related to exports from these countries to third countries net of all import tariffs from the CEEC stemming from imports of agricultural products;
iv) The expected GDP contribution from the CEEC. As the CAP consumes approximately 50 per cent of the total EU budget and the future proportion of GDP from member countries is expected to be slightly below 1.3 per cent, the expected GDP contribution is set to 0.65 per cent of GDP. 4 The existence of sugar and milk quotas in 1995 and the corresponding quota rents should be reflected in the database.
Quota rents are therefore in these cases introduced into the database as wedges between the value of output at producer prices and the value of output at marked prices. The initial value of sugar and milk quota rents incorporated for the EU is estimated to be 20 per cent of the value of purchases of domestically produced raw milk (sugar beet) by dairy (sugar) firms in the EU.
Projections
Compared with other multi-region CGE studies of the economic effects of an EU enlargement, e.g. Hertel et al. (1997b) , Baldwin et al. (1997) , the emphasis of this study is also to construct a baseline with a projection of the world economies as they might look in the year 2005. The baseline can therefore be seen as a counterfactual of the world economy if enlargement does not take place.
It is indeed important to analyse the interactions between economic growth, structural change and policy reforms (see Bach et. al., 1998) . A number of economic and political changes will take place before the enlargement is a reality -some of which will significantly influence the economic consequences of an enlargement. First of all, the baseline takes into account the economic changes following the full implementation of the GATT Agreement and the 1992 EU agricultural reform.
These reforms will change the pattern of production and trade in especially agricultural products.
Secondly, economic growth, technological progress and the degree of convergence between the CEEC and the EU in the period before accession will affect the economic outcome of integrating the CEEC into the EU. Thirdly, in many countries the factor endowments are expected to increase significantly and capital/labour ratios in different countries and industries will change. This will create supply-side pressures for changes in the composition of output in some countries (Rybczynski effects). Finally, differences in income responsiveness of demand for commodities will affect the net export position of a given country and commodity group.
To construct the projection to the year 2005 we shock total population, factor endowments (land, unskilled labour, skilled labour and physical capital) and total factor productivity (TFP). The endowment of land and natural resources are assumed to be constant. The actual shocks used in shaping the baseline are shown in Table 2 Bach (1996) and own calculations.
Skilled labour projections are based on the growth of the total skilled labour stock (average years of secondary and tertiary schooling times population between age 15 and 64) in each country in the period 1980 to 1987 (Nehru, Swanson and Dubey, 1994) . This differs from earlier work (Hertel et. al., 1995; Bach et. al., 1998) in three respects. Firstly, we include secondary schooling where as the earlier estimates included only tertiary schooling, as we believe this yields a better proxy for the growth in skilled labour. Secondly, we use the total stock of skilled labour where the earlier studies used growth in average years of schooling.
Finally, physical capital projections are derived by adding investment forecast for each year to 2005 and subtracting depreciation from 1990 capital stock estimates (Nehru & Dhareshwar, 1993) .
As an important extension to the earlier projection studies, the growth rates for total factor productivity (TFP) in crops and livestock production are assumed to be region and sector specific.
The assumed total factor productivity in agriculture is based on a review of the literature on TFP in a number of regions (Bach, 1996) . It seems that the growth rate in total factor productivity in agriculture has ranged between 1 and 4 per cent over the past decades with most estimates being around 1.5 to 2 per cent. As can be seen from the two last columns in Table 2 , the Central and Eastern European Countries are assumed to have a higher growth in agricultural productivity corresponding to 0.50 and 0.75 per cent more per year compared with the EU countries for crops and livestock, respectively. The higher productivity assumptions for the CEEC might be conservative compared with the potential productivity growth in the former communist countries if the reforms prove successful. Reaching the GDP targets from our long-term projections is obtained by letting TFP in all remaining sectors adjust endogenously in the baseline. 
Experimental design

Additional CAP instruments
Fixed quota for raw milk and sugar cane and beet production Hectare premiums to wheat, coarse grains and other crops are allocated per hectare within the bounds of the total base area of 53,563,000 ha while the total budgetary outlay to oilseeds is fixed due to overshooting of the Blair House Agreement base area. Set-aside rate is held constant at the 1995 level (14,4 per cent). Livestock premiums to suckling cows, male animals, steers and breeding ewes are fixed at total budgetary outlay. All premiums are deflated by 2 per cent as these are fixed in nominal terms.
Central and Eastern European Countries:
Bilateral border taxes are removed between the individual Central and Eastern European Countries (preparations for joining the EU).The effects of the Europe Agreements are not explicitly taken into account.
S-2 CEEC INTEGRATION AFTER S-1, 2005
Removal of all tariffs and export subsidies/taxes between the EU-15 and the CEEC. Fixed milk and sugar production (quota regime) in EU-15 and CEEC if binding. CEEC: External tariffs and export and output subsidies/taxes equalised with those in the EU-15. Hectare premiums to wheat, coarse grains, other crops and oilseeds are given as fixed budgetary outlays to a historic base area of 26,934,000 ha (1994 area). Quota levels for milk and sugar in CEEC are established on the basis on production in 2005 prior to accession. Set-aside rate is equalised with EU-15 rate (14.4 per cent decrease in land productivity). Livestock premiums are given as fixed budgetary outlays based on historic livestock figures (1994) . Transfers from the EU-15 to the CEEC equal to export subsidies, output subsidies and hectare/livestock premiums less import tariffs and 0.65 per cent of GDP in the CEEC. S-3 AGENDA 2000, 1995-2005 Projections and agricultural policies in all region As in S-1, however, TFP in all sectors is shocked exogenous with growth rate found in S-1 with GDP endogenous.
EU-15:
Generally as in S-1, however, further cuts in border protection representing the proposed reductions in intervention prices for cereals, bovine meat and dairy product. Compensatory payments to arable crops are further adjusted in accordance with the proposal. All hectare premiums are given per hectare due to the abolishment of the Blair House Agreement on oilseeds within the bounds of the total base area of 53,563,000 ha. All livestock premiums are adjusted in accordance with the proposal and new premiums to dairy cows. The set-aside rate is reduced from 14,4 to 0 per cent. The total milk quota increased by 2 per cent.
S-4 CEEC INTEGRATION AFTER S-3, 2005
As in Scenario 2 given the agricultural policy in the baseline S-3. Specifically, when modelling reductions in intervention prices we reduce border protection rates corresponding to a 20 per cent reduction in domestic market prices. In the case of wheat, this implies that the remaining import tariffs are abolished and for other grains import tariffs and export subsidy rates are reduced corresponding to a 20 per cent reduction in prices. These reductions are supplemented by increased direct payments to agricultural land and the compulsory set-aside rate is reduced from 14.4 per cent in 1995 to 0 per cent after the full implementation of the proposal. In the beef sector the effective market support level is reduced by 30 per cent and again this reduction is supplemented by increased compensatory payments to livestock (including the national envelopes).
For milk border protection is reduced corresponding to a 15 per cent reduction in intervention prices and the milk quota regime is maintained supplemented by a 2 per cent increase in the total amount of authorised production. The lowering of prices is supplemented by payments (including the national envelopes) to dairy cows. Finally, in scenario four the CEEC are integrated (as in scenario two) in a world as shaped by scenario three.
These scenarios allow us to analyse the impacts of different agricultural policies in both the EU and the CEEC while taking into account the general prospects for economic growth. Moreover, it allows us to analyse the interactions between economic growth, structural change and trade reforms in Europe and the rest of the world simultaneously.
The scenarios: Agricultural protection rates
The initial (1995) and resulting border tax rates and output taxes in 2005 following the two alternative baseline assumptions are shown in Table 3 below. In the first three columns the import tariff equivalents are shown for the base year 1995 as well as the resulting tariff equivalents after projecting the database to 2005. Correspondingly, the next three columns show the initial and final export tax/subsidy rates. In the case of wheat, the initial tariff rate in 1995 is relative low due to high world market prices that year. This implies that the EU-15 tariff rate in that year was well below the final post UR commitment on wheat -and therefore no reductions in the tariff rate is required. However, the export subsidy rate for wheat (initially 12.4 per cent) is reduced in the baseline to zero due to quantitative restrictions on subsidised exports of wheat from EU-15 in accordance with the European Community's UR schedule on commitments limiting subsidisation, cf. (GATT 1994b). 7 In the case of other grains and other crops the same pattern emerges where post UR tariff rates are not binding but export subsidy rates have to be reduced due to quantitative or value commitments in the European Community's UR schedule.
In the case of bovine animals and bovine meat products, the post UR tariff rates are binding wherefore both border tax rates are reduced accordingly. Note also that the export subsidy rates are adjusted accordingly in order to avoid the situation where the import tariff rate is below the export subsidy rate (resulting in a "money machine" effect).
In scenario 3, the Agenda 2000 baseline, the border protection rates differ from scenario 1, as we have chosen to represent reductions in intervention prices by reducing protection rates for wheat, other grains, bovine animals and meat products and dairy products.
In Table 4 (first columns) the corresponding tariff rates for the CEEC in 2005 are shown. Tables 3 and 4 we find the implied changes in the distortions facing CEEC farmers when enlargement takes place (change columns in Table 4 ). Note that including the CEEC in the EU will lead to substantial increases in the CEEC agricultural protection rates against third-country suppliers. Import tariffs and subsidies to exports increase for especially grains, sugar, bovine meat and dairy products without the Agenda 2000 reforms (S-2, change), and much less so if the Agenda 2000 proposal is implemented (S-4, change). Moreover, with the Agenda 2000 in place output subsidies (and input subsidies as well (not shown)) increase significantly in the CEEC when integrated (S-4, changes). Note that protection rates are higher in the CEEC as compared with the EU for vegetables, fruit and nuts, oilseeds, other animal products (pig-and poultry meat) and other processed food products.
Comparing the 2005-levels in
7 In 1995 according to the European Communities notification concerning export subsidy commitments to the World Trade Organisation the EU15 exported 10.8 million tons of wheat, which is below the EU15's final quantity commitment on total subsidised wheat exports of 14.4 million tons, cf. (WTO 1998) . Under the assumption that all wheat export from the EU15 is subsidised in the projection of the database to 2005, the growth of subsidised wheat exports is only allowed to expand by 33 percent. But with this restriction imposed in the projection of the database, the European Community -given the increased global demand for wheat in the baseline -has to tax exports of wheat to remain within the quantity commitment. Therefore, we eliminate wheat export subsidies, cf. 
Results
In presenting the results we will focus on production, market prices, the implications for the EU budget and regional welfare (further results can be found in Frandsen et al. (1998) ).
Production
Changes in output are determined by the assumed productivity increases, export and import growth rates, and the growth in domestic private consumption shaped by income growth and the assumed income elasticities. The resulting production changes in the European Union are given in Table 5 .
The baseline (scenario 1) reflects the structural shift in the composition of European production as the importance of agriculture and the agricultural processing industry declines relative to manufacturing and more capital-intensive industries. During the period of consideration the production of wheat and other grains in the EU increases slightly whereas the production of oilseeds and other crops increases by more than 30 per cent. This shift reflects the assumed relative profitability among the crop sectors following the implementation of the Uruguay Round with lower export subsidies for wheat and other grains, cf. Table 3 . The production of sugar is assumed limited by the EU sugar quota regime. The production of industrial goods and services is projected to increase by around 2 per cent annually. In the animal sectors particulerly the production of bovine animals is affected by the full implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement as the protection rate in 1995 is significantly higher than the EU post UR binding commitment (protection is reduced to the final rate in the year 2000). The production of bovine animals falls by around 12 per cent. The EU dairy policy is assumed unchanged during the period 1995 to 2005 resulting in no changes in the quantity of raw milk produced. The production of wool is more than doubled, which is explained by an increased global demand for wool products caused by an increased regional income growth and the relatively large income elasticity for wool found in most regions.
In scenario 3 we supplement scenario 1 with the Agenda 2000 proposal as described above.
Comparing the results we generally find only small changes in the production of the individual agricultural commodities -with the exception of other grains (lower import tariffs and export subsidies) and bovine animals and bovine meat products (significantly lower border protection).
The production of raw milk/quota increases by 2 per cent as outlined in the Agenda 2000 proposal.
The production of wheat, oilseeds and other crops increases slightly as the profitability of these • See Table 5. products increase relative to the production of other grains (land is reallocated accordingly) 8 .
Integrating the CEEC into the EU, scenario 2, leads to a 3 and 8 per cent decrease in the production of wheat and other grain products in the EU-15 relative to what the production would have been in the absence of enlargement. The production of bovine meat products falls by 3.3 per cent while the milk quota keeps the production of raw milk unchanged. For a number of industries production increases as a result of increased export to the Central European Countries. At first, the 3 per cent increase in the production of vegetables, fruit and nuts in EU-15 are a surprise. However, production of these products falls by 15.5 per cent in the new member countries as the relative protection of these commodities is reduced (lower border protection for vegetables and fruits relative to higher border protection for grains and hectare premiums to the reform crops), cf. Table   6 . Agricultural land is reallocated accordingly to equalise the return to land. Table 6 also illustrates the changes in the pattern of production in the CEEC prior to enlargement.
Integrating the CEEC into the EU changes this pattern dramatically within agriculture at the 8 It is noted that these projections seem to agree quite well with the latest long term 1998-2005 commodity projections form the Commission (1998).
expense of the other industries. Note, also that the production of raw milk in the CEEC is limited by a production quota corresponding to the level of production in the year of integration (2005), whereas the quota for sugar cane and beet is found not to be binding (lower than their 2005 level of production) 9 . Production of manufacturing and services is affected negatively as a result of factor reallocations following the integration of the countries into the EU. This is also a logical consequence of the reduction of protection for these products as tariffs are harmonised (higher initial tariffs in the CEEC). An exception is the textiles and clothing industries where integration spurs further production growth in the CEEC.
Reforming the Common Agricultural Policy according to the Agenda 2000 proposal prior to enlargement does not significantly change the impact of enlargement on the European structure of production. However, the reforms seem to stimulate the production of grains and oilseeds further due to the assumed extension of the hectare premiums to the new members in spite of lower border protection for wheat and grains
10
. Contrarily, the expansionary effect on the production of bovine meat and dairy products in the CEEC is clearly smaller as the border protection is significantly lower after the Agenda 2000 proposal. These impacts on the individual activities in the new member countries reflect the balances between on the one hand the changes in relative border protection rates and the implemented compensatory payments and on the other hand the effects on consumption and the secondary effects through the factor markets.
Finally, production of industrial goods in the Central and Eastern European Countries falls by 1.4
per cent in scenario 4 as compared to 0.6 per cent in scenario 2. The opposite result is found for services where production is now unchanged opposed to a small loss of 0.2 per cent in scenario 2.
The extent to which the remaining industries are affected by the extension of the CAP depends, as demonstrated, on the design of agricultural policies and on the importance of e.g. labour and capital in total costs as well as differences in exposure to international competition in the two industries. 9 We are of course aware that the exact quota level for raw milk and sugar cane and beet as well as the base area for which hectare premiums will be given is subject to the enlargement negotiations.
10 It is noted that the per hectare premium in the new member countries are different in scenario 2 and 4 as the hectare and livestock premiums are implemented as a maximum budgetary outlays based on a historical base area. Therefore, per hectare premiums are endogenous and determined to the extent that the grown area exceeds the base area, cf. Box 1.
Commodity and primary factor prices
When it comes to the simulated market prices, the assumed differential factor growth rates contribute to the diverse development of market prices of factor endowments. Also, the implementation of the GATT Agreement shows up in EU land prices falling by 22 per cent net of the assumed yearly productivity increases over the considered 10-year period, cf. Table 7 . The wage rate increases by 14 per cent while the price of investment goods falls by 12 per cent reflecting the fact that labour will become a relatively scarce resource in the European Union in the coming years, cf. Table 2 . The rent accruing to the so-called natural resources more than doubles as we have assumed (exogenously) that the prices of resource extraction, including energy, increase by 8.8 per cent globally over the considered 10 year period. This estimate is based upon the OECD long-term forecasts of energy prices, cf. OECD (1997) . The shown price changes of primary factors, along with the assumed yearly TFP growth rates, determine the changes in market prices of the produced goods and services. These relative price shifts will of course affect the input factor intensities in all the EU industries -lowering for example the labour/capital ratio over the coming years. The lower protection rates implied by the UR Agreement (scenario 1) combined with the other exogenous assumptions shaping the baseline, including the assumed total productivity growth of 2 per cent per year, lead to falling grain prices of around 20 per cent. The price of bovine animals and bovine meat products are reduced by 27 and 16 per cent, respectively. Coupled with an increased demand for dairy products -both domestically and internationally -the supply constrain imposed by the EU milk quota regime implies that the price of raw milk in the EU-15 rises by 6.7 per cent.
Lower prices generally, with the exception of wages, imply, however, that the price of processed milk falls only slightly over the considered 10 years time period.
In comparison with the first scenario the lower border protection in scenario 3, supplemented by the proposed hectare and livestock premiums leads to a further 2.5 to 3 per cent fall in grain market prices. For dairy products the market prices fall by additionally 15 percentage points which corresponds closely to the proposed cut in intervention prices given the 2 per cent increase in the aggregated EU milk quota. We also find that the EU quota is still binding. For bovine animals and bovine meat products we report a further reduction in market prices of 13 and 5 percentage points, respectively. This is somewhat less than the proposed cut in intervention prices -however -we are here focusing on market prices remembering that the production of bovine meat products in the EU is reduced by 10 percentage points relative to scenario 1. We also find that the Agenda 2000
proposal (combining price cuts with compensatory payments) leads to a slight increase in land prices of almost 3 percentage points, indicating that the proposal only marginally will affect land prices.
Integrating the CEEC leads to only minor reductions of the domestic market prices in the EU-15.
Prices of dairy and bovine meat products decrease by 2 to 3 per cent whereas the prices of grains fall by 0.5 to 1 per cent. Naturally, one could argue that enlarging the EU would not affect market prices facing EU farmers (and thereby production) given the existing system of intervention and variable restitutions for a number of important agricultural commodities. Nevertheless, our simulations illustrate in which markets increased competition from Central and Eastern European farmers potentially could affect future terms of production in the EU-15 if intervention prices and border protection levels remain unaltered 11 . Or to put it differently -enlargement would 11 In case we had explicitly implemented storage (intervention) to fix the domestic market price in the EU or increased the border protection to avoid lower domestic market prices (although against the spirit of the URA) this would affect the composition of production in the EU following enlargement. Agricultural production would therefore not fall for neccessitate changes to the intervention prices for certain products in order to avoid large increase in intervention stocks.
The market price changes in the CEEC are shown in Table 8 . Due to the assumed high total factor productivity growth rates for the agricultural sectors and the reductions in import prices on these commodities, the market prices for all agricultural products decline in scenarios 1 and 3. Agenda 2000 initiatives do not to any notable degree affect market prices in the CEEC. Land prices increase by around 13 per cent and the prices of manufacturing and services rise relative to agricultural prices. Once again different factor growth projections lead to divergent factor returns and the wage rate increases by 25 per cent during the 10-year period. -0.7 -5.9 -0.5 Services -6.9 -0.1 -6.9 0.0 * See Table 5. some of the agricultural commodities, and factor prices would be slightly higher with a relative small negative impact on services and manufacturing. The later reported budgetary and welfare costs would therefore also be slightly higher.
Integrating the Central and Eastern European Countries following scenario 1 causes large increases in the price of agricultural land as the CAP, including hectare and livestock premiums, are extended to farmers in the CEEC. Grain prices increase by 8-12 per cent and prices of dairy products increase by 60 per cent as import tariffs and export subsidies adjust to the EU levels. The price of raw milk triples as we assume that a quota will limit the production of milk. The price effects for grains, bovine meat and dairy products are dampened significantly if integration takes place after the implementation of the Agenda 2000 proposal.
The EU budget and welfare consequences However, costs associated with dairy exports increase by 0.2 billion ECU as exports to third countries increase by 9.5 per cent (not shown). In total expenditures increase by ECU 94 million (1995 prices), cf. Table 9 . If the Agenda 2000 reform proposal is implemented before an enlargement the lower protection of dairy products leads to a small net saving of ECU 38 million.
The rise in EU dairy exports to third countries is now reduced to 6.3 per cent.
Extending the coverage of the CAP to the new members will result in significantly higher agricultural budgetary costs unless the CAP is reformed, cf. grains, bovine meat and dairy products is reduced and compensated by somewhat higher compensatory payments as proposed, the costs associated with integration increase to a total of ECU 14.4 billion. Compared with scenario 2 the costs of export subsidies are reduced by 1995-ECU 850 million whereas the costs of compensatory payments increase by ECU 1.5 billion. Hertel et al. (1997b) find that the total change in the EU budget amounts to 1992-ECU 0.4-1.2 billion which is less than a tenth of our estimate. This is due to different assumptions especially regarding the CAP instruments. Most importantly we take the compensatory payments into account and assume that they will also be extended to the new member countries. It would be politically very difficult to have two different versions of a "Common" Agricultural Policy within the same Union and the recent debate regarding a re-nationalisation of part of the agricultural support does reflect budgetary concerns related to the future enlargement. Furthermore our study is undertaken in a projections mode allowing for changes in factor endowments and some degree of convergence of incomes in Europe prior to accession. This also means that our study is based on larger Armington elasticities, which imply substantially greater supply response in the CEEC. (Tangermann and Josling, 1994; Slater and Atkinson, 1995; Tangermann, 1996) . Adding the costs of including Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania would, based simply on relative population size, add another 50 per cent to these estimates and still place our estimate within the range.
More important than budgetary implications should be the overall welfare implications (although it sometimes appears as if policy makers value the budget over total economic welfare). These welfare effects include changes in allocative efficiency, terms of trade, inter-regional transfers and contributions from other factors (changes in endowments, technical changes and effects from nonhomothetic preferences). The welfare effects are shown in Table 12 . Note: Economic welfare is measured as the money metric value of the Equivalent Variation. 'Other effects' include welfare changes due to changes in endowment, technical changes, and effects from the non-homothetic preferences.
In total, the CEEC are estimated to gain a welfare improvement of ECU 11.9 billion (measured as the money metric value of the Equivalent Variation) following integration with the existing CAP.
This corresponds to a welfare gain of 4.6 per cent. If the agricultural policy is reformed according to the Agenda 2000 proposal, almost the same welfare gain is found (ECU 12.1 billion). (which, however, should be carefully interpreted, see Rodrik, 1997) . For the EU they find a real income gain of ECU 9.8 billion, which contrasts our welfare loss. Their stylised representation of the CAP and lack of an endogenous budget allocation clearly explains this.
For the remaining non-member regions considered in this analysis we find only very small welfare effects (for a detailed discussion of the welfare implication of a European enlargement on nonmember regions see Frandsen et al., (1998) ).
It is important to note that these welfare effects only tell part of the story. Most importantly we have not accounted for the possible dynamic effects of integration such as enhanced capital accumulation and higher productivity growth. The implications for investments could be substantial due to a reduction in the risk premium in the CEEC following a more stable and predictable environment (Baldwin et al., 1997) . Another factor not accounted for is a reduction in trade costs due to the adoption of uniform rules and procedures, which, however, has a mirror image in the higher costs needed to raise standards in the CEEC.
Qualification
Besides modelling the CAP instruments the structure of the model in general is important for e.g. the size of the welfare implications of integrating the Central and Eastern European Countries.
Using a relatively standard neo-classical structure assuming constant returns to scale technologies, perfect competition and no income-investment linkages implies lower welfare effects from trade reforms as compared with models that incorporate scale economies, imperfect competition and accumulation effects. These effects are important features in the literature on the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement (Cox and Harris, 1985) , the NAFTA (Francois and Shiells, 1994) and European
Integration (Venables and Smith, 1988; Baldwin, 1992 , Hertel et. al, 1997b .
Trade flows, production levels and budgetary implications of integrating the CEEC into the CAP also depend upon the Armington specification and the size of the trade elasticities. Generally, models with Armington specifications yield smaller trade and output effects than models with homogenous goods or models with firm-level product differentiation (see Francois et al., 1996) .
The elasticities used in this study with respect to the agricultural products are typically around 9 for the import nest between different regions and around 4.5 between the domestic commodity and (a composite of) imports. Naturally, if these elasticities are reduced the increases in the CEEC production and exports of agricultural products are correspondingly smaller when integration takes
place. This in turn would lead to smaller budgetary costs of integrating the CEEC. The chosen level of aggregation also matters for the results found, cf. Gehlhar and Frandsen (1998) .
Sensitivity analysis indicate that the budgetary costs of integrating the Central and Eastern
European Countries are reduced by approximately 10 per cent to ECU 12.3 billion when trade elasticities are halved. Moreover, if we assume that the hectare and animal premiums are not extended to the new member countries -although difficult to envisage given the present policythe budgetary cost of an enlargement would be reduced to 6.9 ECU billion compared to the ECU 13.9 billion reported earlier.
As noted earlier the projections do not explicitly deal with the Europe Agreements as these are very restrictive with respect to agricultural trade. However, to the extent that they provide some access prior to full membership for the CEEC farmers to EU prices the calculated costs of accession might be slightly exaggerated.
Further, in the accession scenarios consistency with EU22 WTO disciplines has not been dealt with explicitly in this paper. These aspects could potentially be important issues in the WTO discussions related to European Enlargement between the European Countries and a number of other WTO contracting parties. Some of these aspects are dealt with explicitly in . 
Concluding remarks
The focus of this analysis has been to assess the effects of integrating the Central and Eastern
European Countries into the EU, with detailed modelling of the CAP and the Uruguay Round Agreement and with projections to the year 2005. Addressing the integration issue in a projections mode is essential in order to capture the economic growth and structural changes before integration.
The specific modelling of the EU agricultural policy instruments allows us to capture the important implications of the Uruguay Round commitments, export subsidies, set-aside requirements, compensatory payments and the milk and sugar quota. While these estimates may shed additional light on the economic implications of an eastward enlargement of the European Union, they are, of course, dwarfed by the historical and political importance of creating a united and peaceful Europe.
